Great Nicobar: India’s unsinkable power play 

October 13, 2025

When former US President Donald Trump declared on Truth Social that “we have lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China,” the comment underscored how India’s choices are increasingly seen through the lens of great-power competition. On the same day, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, during an official visit to New Delhi, welcomed India’s interest in joint naval patrols in the Malacca Strait, reaffirming the strategic rivalry between India and China that continues to shape the future of Asia.

At the heart of this competition lies India’s ambitious plan to develop Great Nicobar Island (GNI) into a major transshipment port, airport, power plant, and township. The $9.6 billion project, located near the entrance to the Malacca Strait, seeks to transform the island into a strategic and commercial hub. The Strait remains one of the world’s most vital maritime arteries, carrying up to 60 percent of global trade and most of China’s energy imports. By developing GNI, New Delhi aims to strengthen control over this critical chokepoint while projecting power across the Bay of Bengal and the eastern Indian Ocean.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a chain of 572 islands stretching from Myanmar to Indonesia’s Sumatra, are central to India’s maritime strategy. Great Nicobar offers an unmatched geographic advantage, giving India proximity to the Six Degree Channel, a key passage for global shipping. The Modi government views the project as essential to expanding India’s naval presence, enhancing logistics, and supporting economic growth in the region. Officials have described it as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” that anchors India’s Indo-Pacific strategy and its role as a net security provider.

However, the project has become the subject of intense political and environmental debate. Congress leader Sonia Gandhi has denounced it as a “planned misadventure,” alleging violations of environmental regulations and the displacement of indigenous communities, particularly the Shompen tribe. Critics warn that construction will harm coral reefs and sea turtle nesting sites. Environmental groups have also expressed concern over the scale of deforestation planned for the project.

The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rejects these criticisms, portraying the opposition as politically motivated. Some analysts note that the Congress’s opposition could also be viewed through the prism of its 2008 memorandum of understanding with the Chinese Communist Party, raising questions about the broader geopolitical context of the debate. The controversy reflects the wider tension between ecological protection and strategic necessity in India’s infrastructure development.

For New Delhi, the Great Nicobar project is part of a larger effort to counter China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s maritime expansion, backed by the world’s largest navy of over 370 vessels, has been accompanied by the construction of dual-use ports and logistics facilities across the region—from Cambodia and Myanmar to Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative has further deepened its influence across the Indian Ocean littorals.

China’s activities have not gone unnoticed. In recent years, Indian naval forces have tracked Chinese research and surveillance vessels operating near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In 2019, the Indian Navy expelled a Chinese research ship found operating in the region without authorization. Beijing’s expanding network of ports and maritime assets, coupled with its regular naval patrols in the Indian Ocean, has reinforced India’s determination to enhance its maritime infrastructure and surveillance capabilities.

India has responded with its own strategic initiatives. The tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) at Port Blair has become a key forward base for monitoring the eastern Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy’s Maritime Infrastructure Perspective Plan envisions transforming several island outposts into major hubs equipped with upgraded runways, jetties, and radar systems. Plans are also underway to expand India’s naval fleet from 140 to over 200 vessels by 2035, including additional nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers.

India’s growing cooperation with regional partners complements this expansion. Joint exercises with Japan, Australia, and the United States under the Quad framework have strengthened India’s ability to monitor and counter Chinese movements across the Indo-Pacific. The country’s participation in the US-led Combined Maritime Force and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness enhances coordination in anti-submarine warfare and maritime surveillance.

Economic cooperation is also deepening. Japan has pledged $30 million through an Official Development Assistance program for development projects in the Andamans. Tokyo’s collaboration extends to Indonesia’s Sabang port, strategically located near the western entrance of the Malacca Strait. Together, these efforts are shaping a network of maritime infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific that reinforces India’s role as a stabilizing power.

The Great Nicobar project also has a strong economic rationale. It aims to position India as a global transshipment hub comparable to Colombo or Singapore, reducing dependency on foreign ports for handling Indian cargo. The project could also unlock mineral resources, including cobalt, nickel, and manganese, that are vital for India’s industrial and clean-energy ambitions.

For Beijing, however, the Nicobar development heightens its long-standing “Malacca Dilemma”—its dependence on a narrow maritime corridor vulnerable to disruption in a crisis. Chinese commentators have already cautioned that India’s moves could invite a strategic competition detrimental to both sides. Yet for India, the project represents a message of resolve: that any pressure along the Himalayan frontier will have consequences across the seas.

Despite occasional diplomatic engagement, the India-China rivalry has become structural, rooted in competing geopolitical visions and growing asymmetries in power. India’s trade deficit with China remains a persistent concern, and military tensions along the Line of Actual Control have shown little sign of abating since the 2020 clashes. The contest now extends from the mountains to the maritime domain, shaping the strategic balance across the Indo-Pacific.

As China consolidates its presence in the Indian Ocean, the Great Nicobar project signals New Delhi’s intent not just to defend but to project influence across the region. The challenge will lie in balancing national security objectives with environmental and social concerns, ensuring that strategic ambition does not undermine ecological and community sustainability.

In the longer term, the success of the project may depend on India’s ability to align domestic priorities with international cooperation. A coordinated Indo-Pacific Maritime Infrastructure and Surveillance Initiative, bringing together India, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asian nations, could strengthen collective maritime awareness and resilience against external pressure.

Ultimately, Great Nicobar represents more than an infrastructure venture. It is a statement of India’s geopolitical intent—to shape, rather than merely respond to, the evolving order of the Indo-Pacific. The island’s transformation, if managed wisely, could redefine India’s maritime future and reinforce its standing as a central player in the emerging Asian balance of power.