- विज्ञापन -
As we analyse the recent turbulence and India’s major achievements, it’s also time to examine where we can make our response more effective in the future exchanges that the subcontinent appears to be headed for. India’s response to the horrific Pahalgam carnage has demonstrated the maturity, precision and resolve of a rising power that now fully understands the utility of force and thresholds of escalation. In many ways, the nation displayed the best of its operational capacity— marked by calm political judgement, tight escalation control and a well-executed military response in the form of Operation Sindoor.
The strikes on the nine targets were calibrated to send a message not just across the border, but also to domestic audiences, global partners and observers in regions of strategic interest. The selection of targets, element of surprise and overall risk calculus showed that India can achieve tactical and operational brilliance even in a complex, nuclear shadowed environment. Yet, amid this military success lies a sobering truth. While India controlled the battlefield, it did not fully control the narrative as it emerged. Pakistan’s narrative flooded digital and traditional platforms, shaping early perceptions in its favour.
There is a reason for this that needs to be understood. Operational planning must include narrative-building as a sub-domain, but when the focus is on operational objectives, this aspect tends to get relegated under the pressure of secrecy. Pakistan was not working under that constraint. For it, narrative-building and painting itself the victim took prime focus. Although ultimately exposed, the early dominance of Islamabad’s messaging significantly shaped how global audiences—and even parts of India’s own population—viewed the unfolding events. This is not a new pattern. India has often shown restraint and strategic patience in kinetic responses, but struggles to maintain the same composure and coherence in the information space. In today’s world, narrative dominance is not a soft addition to strategic power—it is its own domain of conflict. Winning the information war is all about building long-term architecture, proactive planning, and the seamless integration of talent, technology and timing.
The military conduct of Operation Sindoor deserves study. It achieved tactical surprise through unconventional launch timings and access routes, leveraging intelligence assets effectively, and striking targets that were both symbolic and strategic. By doing so, it signalled to Pakistan’s deep state and political leadership that India’s red lines are no longer theoretical. F u r t h e r , I n d i a communicated deterrence and resolve to international stakeholders—friends and adversaries alike. The US and France quietly acknowledged the necessity of India’s response, while more cautious voices such as Turkey and Malaysia took opposite stands. Subsequently, US responses were more personality-led, although the liberal media did not support us as could be expected. American military journals, such as the respected War on the Rocks, did do a realistic appreciation of India’s military operations.
These signals needed to be accompanied by the shaping of global public opinion, elite consensus and open-source information flows. That is where India must now introspect. By the time India’s information response was launched, Pakistan had already occupied much information space. It positioned itself, predictably and falsely, as a victim— muddying the waters with propaganda, fabricated videos and diplomatic noise. International media outlets, starved of immediate information, resorted to quoting Pakistani sources or speculative think tanks. While India’s restraint in the fog of conflict is understandable, especially when operations are underway—the vacuum of authoritative storytelling allowed the adversary to frame the crisis on its terms. In strategic communication, perception forms early—and is hard to dislodge once set. In this respect, the kinetic brilliance of Operation Sindoor may have been matched by higher levels of informational preparedness.
What this experience highlights is the need for a dedicated, statutory body on national strategic c o m m u n i c a t i o n — a c i v i l – m i l i t a r y- m e d i a interface that works not in isolation, but as part of India’s national security architecture.
This institution could be structured to include:
• Representatives from the ministries of external affairs, defence, home, and information & broadcasting;
The aim is not to create a propaganda machine, but rather a truth-delivery architecture—capable of shaping narratives, countering disinformation, and building sustained influence over time. It should monitor information threats in real-time, advise on messaging strategies and deploy multi-platform campaigns pre-emptively, not merely in response. This body should not operate in parallel or in competition with the I&B ministry, but in sync with it. The I&B ministry has institutional experience in mass communication, but often lacks the strategic context in crises of national security. Conversely, intelligence and defence entities understand the threat landscape, but are not storytellers by training. The fusion of these domains is essential. India also has a vibrant pool of digital creators, influencers, filmmakers and content strategists who can be co-opted in times of crisis, not for jingoism but for factual amplification.
The lessons from Ukraine’s masterful information campaign post-2022 are clear: a narrative war is won as much on Telegram as on the battlefield. Strategic communication is not a luxury to be designed in peacetime. It is a warfighting capability that must be crisis-responsive, mission-ready, rehearsed and resourced. India’s adversaries—both state and non-state—operate 24/7 in the information domain.
The post Pahalgam crisis offers a clear case study: India can strike decisively, calibrate escalation prudently and signal resolve without crossing into recklessness. But unless we complement military strength with narrative power, we risk repeating the same strategic oversight. The five domains of modern warfare—land, sea, air, space and cyber— now have added a sixth: narrative. Control over the story shapes control over outcomes, alliances and perceptions. As India emerges as a regional and global power, it must not just win battles; it must also win belief. Operation Sindoor will be remembered as a moment of resolve and professional excellence. Let it also become the turning point where India moves from episodic communication to institutionalised strategic storytelling, worthy of its politico-military and diplomatic prowess.
Author Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd) is former commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps, Views are personal
