Mecca Pact: Why Pakistan Can’t Fund Long War

October 15, 2026

Pakistan, which signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (called the Mecca Pact) with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, is facing a dilemma as the Mecca Pact has not failed; it was announced before it was built. Pakistan can field a limited deployment; it cannot easily fund a long war. The FY27 budget sets defence at Rs 3.0 trillion (2.1 per cent of projected GDP) against Rs 8.05 trillion for debt service (5.6 per cent) and promises the IMF an underlying primary surplus of 2 per cent of GDP, Rs 2.83 trillion. Each extra 10 per cent of defence spending, therefore, costs Rs 300 billion: 0.21 per cent of GDP, 10.6 per cent of that surplus, about $1.1 billion, close to the $1.21 billion IMF tranche awaiting Board approval. Pakistan is squeezed from both sides: Riyadh’s money makes failing to deliver costly, while an IMF that wants any fuel support limited and inside the budget makes overdelivering costly. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement is a trilateral collective security alliance signed on August 7, 2026, by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. Four weeks after the first Houthi barrage on Saudi cities, the Mecca Pact’s committee announced on October 5 that it would activate collective deterrence and ensure the “rapid deployment” of “agreed” forces. Within five days Pakistan’s Information Ministry had called a New York Times report of Pakistani air strikes on the Houthis ‘fake and fabricated’, its Foreign Office had ruled out crossing into Yemen, and Türkiye’s foreign minister had ruled out troops for attacks on another country. Houthi-claimed attacks killed three Saudis at Riyadh’s airport. The pact was activated and disowned in the same week. That contradiction is the argument: a collective-defence promise whose content its authors will not state cannot deter. Moreover, for India, an overstretched Pakistan, dependent on Riyadh and the IMF, is a less predictable neighbour, not a weaker one.